Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

Attila Tasnádi

We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer’s model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer’s model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.

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Year of publication:	August 17, 2009
Authors:	Tasnádi, Attila
Publisher:	Brussels, Belgium : EERI, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute
Subject:	Forchheimer \| Dominant firm \| Price leadership \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Preiswettbewerb \| Price competition \| Unvollkommener Markt \| Incomplete market \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Preismanagement \| Pricing strategy \| Marktmacht \| Market power \| Preisführer

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 20 Seiten)
Series:	EERI research paper series. - Brussels : EERI, ISSN 2031-4892, ZDB-ID 2861229-2. - Vol. no 2009/25
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/142557 [Handle]
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011523962