Quasitransitive Social Preference : Why Some Very Large Coalitions Have Very Little Power

If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y)

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Campbell, Donald E. ; Kelly, Jerry S.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Koalition \| Coalition \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economic Theory, Vol. 12, Iss. 1, 1998 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217938