Raiding and Signaling in the Academic Labor Market
Publications signal a professor’s productivity and may lead to raids by other universities. A raided professor learns the value of non-wage benefits at a raiding university, and will quit only if benefits elsewhere are relatively high. The social value of these benefits suggests research may be efficient even in the absence of a direct social value from research. Other results are: in some cases, a school may preempt signaling by paying a higher wage, but it will only do so when signaling is inefficient; and it is inefficient for a university to commit to not match outside offers.
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Perri, Timothy J. |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Appalachian State University |
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