Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent
We find that executives who jump to chief executive officer (CEO) positions at new employers come from firms that exhibit aboveaverage stock price performance. This relationship is more pronounced for more senior executives. No such relationship exists for jumps to non-CEO positions. Stock options and restricted stock do not appear to significantly affect the likelihood of jumping ship, but the existence of an "heir apparent" on the management team increases the likelihood that executives will leave for non-CEO positions elsewhere. Hiring grants used to attract managers are correlated with the equity position forfeited at the prior employer and with the prior employer's performance. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fee, C. Edward |
Published in: |
Review of Financial Studies. - Society for Financial Studies - SFS. - Vol. 16.2003, 4, p. 1315-1357
|
Publisher: |
Society for Financial Studies - SFS |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Proprietary Costs and the Disclosure of Information About Customers
ELLIS, JESSE A., (2012)
-
Fee, C. Edward, (2012)
-
Managers with and without Style: Evidence Using Exogenous Variation
Fee, C. Edward, (2013)
- More ...