Random aggregation without the Pareto principle
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Picot, Jérémy |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 16.2012, 1, p. 1-13
|
Subject: | Koalition | Coalition | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Theorie | Theory |
-
Coalition preferences with individual prospects
Baucells, Manel, (2018)
-
Locating a public good on a sphere
Chatterjee, Swarnendu, (2016)
-
Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and the Pareto Rule
Umezawa, Masashi, (2016)
- More ...
-
Random aggregation without the Pareto principle
Picot, Jérémy, (2012)
-
Picot, Jérémy, (2012)
-
Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems
Mbih, Boniface, (2008)
- More ...