Random belief equilibrium in normal form games
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Friedman, James W. ; Mezzetti, Claudio |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 51.2005, 2, p. 296-323
|
Subject: | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Stochastischer Prozess | Stochastic process | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Theorie | Theory | Normalformspiel | Normal-form game |
-
Rationalizable foresight dynamics
Matsui, Akihiko, (2006)
-
Rationalizable foresight dynamics : evolution and rationalizability
Matsui, Akihiko, (2002)
-
Convergence results on stochastic adaptive learning
Funai, Naoki, (2019)
- More ...
-
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games
Friedman, James W., (2005)
-
Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements
Friedman, James W., (1998)
-
Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations
Friedman, James W., (2002)
- More ...