Random inspections and periodic reviews : optimal dynamic monitoring
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Varas, Felipe ; Marinovic, Iván ; Skrzypacz, Andrzej |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies : RES. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Pr., ISSN 1467-937X, ZDB-ID 2009656-2. - Vol. 87.2020, 6, p. 2893-2937
|
Subject: | Monitoring | Auditing | Dynamic contracts | Dynamic fames | Reputation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Dynamische Wirtschaftstheorie | Economic dynamics |
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