Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chatterji, Shurojit ; Zeng, Huaxia |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 182.2019, p. 25-105
|
Subject: | Connected domains | Generalized random dictatorships | Multidimensional single-peakedness | Separability | Top-separability | Voting under constraints | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Diktatur | Dictatorship | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
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