Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Matsumura, Toshihiro ; Murooka, Takeshi ; Ogawa, Akira |
Published in: |
Operations research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6377, ZDB-ID 7207359. - Vol. 39.2011, 2, p. 115-118
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