Rank-Order Tournaments and Selection.

Rank order tournaments are often presented as incentive devices: a tournament in which the hardest working individual gains promotion to the next level in a firms' hierarchy may induce workers to exert extra effort for example. In this paper, we consider a tournament in which workers are expected to be heterogenous, so that the principal cares about who is promoted, worker ability is, however, unknown to the principal.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Clark, D.J. ; Riis, C.
Institutions:	Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo
Subject:	ENTREPRISES \| WORKERS \| PROMOTION

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	Memorandum.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Memorandum Number 27/1996 19 pages
Classification:	J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005198055