Ranking asymmetric auctions : filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kirkegaard, René |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 85.2014, p. 60-69
|
Subject: | Stochastic games | Repeated games | Folk theorem | Wiederholte Spiele | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Stochastisches Spiel | Stochastic game | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Folk-Theorem |
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