Ranking performance measures in multi-task agencies
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Christensen, Peter Ove ; Şabac, Florin ; Tian, Jie Joyce |
Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Sarasota, Fla. : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 85.2010, 5, p. 1545-1575
|
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Ranking-Verfahren | Ranking method | Anreiz | Incentives |
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