Rat Races and Glass Ceilings: Career Paths in Organizations.

In an ongoing organization, such as a large law parternship firm, employees are motivated not only by current rewards but also by the prospect of promotion, and the opportunity to influence policy and make the rules in the future. This leads to a dynamic programming problem in contract design. We model career design in such a firm as a recursive mechanism design problem in an overlapping generations environment.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Bardsley, P. ; Sherstyuk, K.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics
Subject:	CONTRACTS \| GENERATIONS \| COSTS

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Series:	Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 825 31 pages
Classification:	J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005578931