Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability
For a steady state to be a Nash equilibrium the agents have to perfectly observe the actions of others. This paper suggests a solution concept for cases where players observe only an imperfect signal of what the others' actions are. The model is enriched by specifying the signal that each player has about the actions taken by the others. The solution, which we call rationalizbale conjectural equilibrium (RCE), is a profile of actions such that each player's action is optimal, given the assumption that it is common knowledge that all players maximize their expected utility given their knowledge. The RCE occupies an intermediary position between Nash equilibrium on one hand and Rationalizability style Bernheim-Pearce on the other hand. The concept is demonstrated by several examples in which it refines the rationalizability concept and still is not equivalent to Nash equilibrium.
Year of publication: |
1991
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Authors: | Rubinstein, Ariel ; Wolinsky, Asher |
Publisher: |
Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | Discussion Paper ; 933 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/221292 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:933 [RePEc] |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235748
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