Rationalizable Implementation

This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution concept. We show that it is also sufficient under a mild "no worst alternative" condition. In particular, no economic condition is required.

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Year of publication:	2009-05
Authors:	Bergemann, Dirk ; Morris, Stephen
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Implementation \| Complete information \| Rationalizability \| Maskin monotonicity

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	CFP 1328 Published in Journal of Economic Theory (May 2011), 146(3): 1253–1274 The price is None Number 1697 21 pages
Classification:	C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998323