Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Kamada, Yuichiro ; Fudenberg, Drew
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 10.2015, 3, p. 775-806
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Rationalizablity \| common knowledge \| extensive-form games \| self-confirming equilibrium

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE1362 [DOI] 893523658 [GVK] hdl:10419/150262 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:1362 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599553