Rationalization of Indecisive Choice Behavior by Majoritarian Ballots

We describe a model that explains possibly indecisive choice behavior, that is, quasi-choices (choice correspondences that may be empty on some menus). The justification is here provided by a proportion of ballots, which are quasi-choices rationalizable by an arbitrary binary relation. We call a quasi-choice s-majoritarian if all options selected from a menu are endorsed by a share of ballots larger than s.We prove that all forms of majoritarianism are equivalent to a well-known behavioral property, namely Chernoff axiom. Then we focus on two paradigms of majoritarianism, whereby either a simple majority of ballots justifies a quasi-choice, or the endorsement by a single ballot suffices -- a liberal justification. These benchmark explanations typically require a different minimum number of ballots. We determine the asymptotic minimum size of a liberal justification