Rationing the Commons
Nicholas Ryan, Anant Sudarshan
Common resources may be managed with inefficient policies for the sake of equity. We study how rationing the commons shapes the efficiency and equity of resource use, in the context of agricultural groundwater use in Rajasthan, India. We find that rationing binds on input use, such that farmers, despite trivial prices for water extraction, use roughly the socially optimal amount of water on average. The rationing regime is still grossly inefficient, because it misallocates water across farmers, lowering productivity. Pigouvian reform would increase agricultural surplus by 12% of household income, yet fall well short of a Pareto improvement over rationing
Year of publication: |
July 2020
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Authors: | Ryan, Nicholas |
Other Persons: | Sudarshan, Anant (contributor) |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
2020: Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Rationierung | Rationing | Gemeinwohl | Common good | Indien | India | Gemeingüter | Commons | Wasser | Water | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Theorie | Theory | Pflanzenbau | Crop production |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource illustrations (black and white) |
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Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w27473 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Mode of access: World Wide Web Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w27473 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481328