Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining

A new explanation for the failure of plea bargaining is provided. It is shown that a retention agent (i.e. median voter) can use convictions at trial as a signal of the quality of a prosecutor. This encourages a public prosecutor to take cases to trial even when both social welfare and her utility (absent the retention motivatiOn) from plea bargaining is higher.

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Year of publication:	2010-10
Authors:	Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha ; McCannon, Bryan C
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
Subject:	plea bargaining \| prosecutor evaluation \| signaling

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	12 pages
Classification:	K41 - Litigation Process ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727234