Real Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, IPOs, and Business Risk

We study investment options in a dynamic agency model. Moral hazard creates anoption to wait and agency conflicts affect the timing of investment. The model shedslight, theoretically and quantitatively, on the evolution of firms dynamics, in particular the decline of the failure rate and the decrease in the age of IPOs

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Year of publication:	[2010]
Authors:	Philippon, Thomas
Other Persons:	Sannikov, Yuliy (contributor)
Publisher:	[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (34 p)
Series:	NYU Working Paper ; No. FIN-07-010
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 2007 erstellt
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012758250