Recursive Contracts, Firm Longevity, and Rat Races: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Bardsley, Peter ; Erkal, Nisvan ; Nikiforakis, Nikos ; Wilkening, Tom |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics |
Subject: | Overlapping-generations models | Recursive contracts | Rat races | Experiments |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 1122 30 pages |
Classification: | C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; D21 - Firm Behavior ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing |
Source: |
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