Reduced-form mechanism design and ex post fairness constraints
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Yang, Erya |
Published in: |
Economic theory bulletin. - Cham : Springer Internat. Publ., ISSN 2196-1093, ZDB-ID 2733052-7. - Vol. 9.2021, 2, p. 269-293
|
Subject: | Reduced-form auctions | Implementation | Border’s theorem | welfare maximization | Fairness | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Gerechtigkeit | Justice | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics |
Description of contents: | Description [doi.org] |
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