Reducing agency conflicts through bank dividend payout decisions : the role of opacity and ownership structure
Year of publication: |
October 2017
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Authors: | Lepetit, Lætitia ; Meslier, Celine ; Wardhana, Leo Indra |
Published in: |
Applied economics. - Abingdon : Routledge, ISSN 0003-6846, ZDB-ID 280176-0. - Vol. 49.2017, 49, p. 4999-5026
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Subject: | Bank | dividend | opacity | ownership concentration | Dividende | Dividend | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance |
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