Reducing rent seeking by providing wide public service
A winning coalition which sets policy cannot always ensure that members of the coalition will be the ones getting benefits. Different jurisdictions (including members of the winning coalition) may then engage in costly rent seeking. Maximizing the welfare of the winning coalition may therefore require providing services to jurisdictions which are not members of the winning coalition, thereby reducing rent seeking by members of the winning coalition. The paper shows how this mechanism can generate insuffcient supply of public services, and offers another explanation for the use of co-funding requirements by the central government.
Year of publication: |
2010-11
|
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Authors: | GLAZER, Amihai ; PROOST, Stef |
Institutions: | Centrum voor Economische Studiƫn, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen |
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