Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition : A Proposal to Resurrect Rival Unionism

This Article examines the effects of rival unionism on organizing, something that most scholars have long assumed to be a negative variable. However, my research points to the opposite conclusion. I argue that the absence of a competitive marketplace among unions has contributed, at least in part, to the decline in union density in the private sector. Accordingly, rather than beat back rival unionism, I propose that the AFL-CIO and the NLRB take steps toward creating a competitive market for union control. In support of my thesis that union rivalry is a positive variable that should be nurtured and not extinguished, I offer both historical and empirical evidence. In Part II of this Article I study the impact of competition on union organizing by analyzing four historical examples: the battle between the Knights of Labor and the craft unions; the war between the AFL and the CIO; the recent challenge launched by the California Nurses Association against AFL-CIO nurses' unions; and the meteoric growth of public sector unions. In Part III, I turn to empirical data and examine the results of mutli-union elections in both the private and public sectors. In Part IV, I debunk the theory that inter-union competition is necessarily a waste of union resources that drives down industry standards, and I suggest alternative theories for why unions generally oppose competition. In Part V, I offer three theories for how competition would result in membership gains. Finally, in Part VI, I propose that the AFL-CIO repeal the anti-competitive no-raiding pact (and rival union organizing procedures for unrepresented workers), and the NLRB soften the contract bar to allow for more competition, relax the requirements for craft unit severance, and require strict employer neutrality in all rival union situations