Reexamination of risk-taking incentives in banking : realign incentives and curtail future episodes of mismanagement
Year of publication: |
May 2017
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Authors: | Yang, Xiaolou |
Published in: |
The quarterly review of economics and finance : journal of the Midwest Economics Association ; journal of the Midwest Finance Association. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1062-9769, ZDB-ID 1114217-0. - Vol. 64.2017, p. 238-248
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Subject: | Executive compensations | Deregulation | Financial crisis | Finanzkrise | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Deregulierung | Führungskräfte | Managers | Anreiz | Incentives | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | Bankrisiko | Bank risk |
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