Reference-Dependent Reservation Utility and the Comparison Discount

This paper investigates how a risk averse and loss averse agent having reference-dependent reservation utility, affects the cost to the principal when the agent also has reference-dependent preferences. The main finding is that, under these circumstances, if the agent compares his outside alternative to the principal's offer, the principal pays less – a comparison discount – relative to the cost when reservation utility is not reference-dependent

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Pierre, Norbert
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Nutzen \| Utility \| Diskontierung \| Discounting

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (16 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 10, 2014 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2364443 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D84 - Expectations; Speculations ; M12 - Personnel Management ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061876