Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games.

We investigate experimentally whether preferences over an outcome depend on what other possible outcomes of the situation under consideration are, i.e. whether choices are "menu dependent". In simple sequential games we analyze whether reactions to a certain benchmark oucome are influenced by changes in the payoffs of another outcome of the game, not attainable at that time, which we call the "reference point".

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Brandts, J. ; Sola, C.
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Subject:	EXPERIMENTS \| GAME THEORY

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Series:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	28 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168500