Reference Points, Performance and Ability: A Real Effort Experiment on Framed Incentive Schemes
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hilken, K. ; Rosenkranz, S. ; Jaegher, K.J.M. De ; Jegers, M. |
Institutions: | School of Economics, Universiteit Utrecht |
Subject: | Real Effort Experiment | Optimal Payment Scheme | Principal-Agent Relationship | Ability | Bonus | Penalty |
-
Bonus versus penalty : how robust are the effects of contract framing?
De Quidt, Jonathan, (2016)
-
An empirical analysis of employee responses to bonuses and penalties
Van der Stede, Wim A., (2020)
-
Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?
de Quidt, Jonathan, (2016)
- More ...
-
Strategic Framing in Contracts
Hilken, K., (2013)
-
Understanding preferences for ascending auctions, Buy-It-Now auctions and fixed prices
Delnoij, J.M.J., (2014)
-
The value of private information in the physician-patient relationship: a gametheoretic account
Jaegher, K.J.M. De, (2012)
- More ...