Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Kuzmics, Christoph ; Balkenborg, Dieter ; Hofbauer, Josef |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 8.2013, 1, p. 165-192
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Evolutionary game theory | best response dynamics | CURB sets | persistent retracts | asymptotic stability | Nash equilibrium refinements | learning |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE652 [DOI] 894221043 [GVK] hdl:10419/150188 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:652 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games |
Source: |
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