Reform for sale : a common agency model with moral hazard frictions

Perrin Lefebvre and David Martimort

This Element focuses on the efforts of interest groups who try to to influence a policy-maker who in turn exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. It analyses linking of the allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus, as both depend on the set of active principals as well as on the group size.

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Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Lefebvre, Perrin ; Martimort, David
Publisher:	Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
Subject:	Lobbying \| multiprincipals \| pluralistic politics \| common agency \| moral hazard \| Theorie \| Theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Interessenpolitik

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Extent:	1 online resource (78 pages) digital, PDF file(s)
Series:	Cambridge elements. Elements in law, economics and politics
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Also issued in print: 2023. - Includes bibliographical references. - Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (viewed on February 28, 2023)
ISBN:	978-1-009-28560-5 ; 978-1-009-28558-2 ; 978-1-009-28558-2
Other identifiers:	10.1017/9781009285605 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014466686