Reforming the Governance of the International Monetary Fund

Democratising the governance of the IMF will significantly improve the institution's capacity to manage crises. The implementation of a democratic framework requires a reform of the Fund's 'quota regime,' which mediates the distribution of voting power. An optimal reform of the quota regime that reflects the increased weight of emerging economies requires matching the number of policy objectives with the number of policy instruments. Presently, there is a classic 'assignment problem' whereby one policy instrument (i.e., the quota regime) is aimed at achieving three objectives (i.e., member contribution obligations, access rights, and voting rights). Three different instruments need to be adopted. Member contributions should be based on member's capacity to pay; access to resources should be based on need; and voting rights should balance the rights of creditors with the principle of sovereign equality. These reforms will enhance the Fund's legitimacy and accountability as a forum for global economic policy-making. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.