Regional Trade Liberalisation as a Prisoners’ Dilemma : The Case of the SADC Protocol on Trade

This paper addresses the following key question. Why is it that African governments that enthusiastically sign trade liberalisation agreements at one point, so spectacularly fail to implement subsequent liberalisation provisions; a necessary step towards mutually desirable free trade gains. Why is it that African governments, generally seem eager to embrace trade liberalisation on paper, while they loath to act cooperatively to achieve it in practice?In addressing these questions, this paper does not attempt to dispute conventional explanations of the poor record of trade liberalisation in Africa, rather it seeks to compliment these explanations by providing a more comprehensive explanation which goes beyond simple material considerations. A new dimension embraces examination of the effects of strategic factors on governments implementing a regional trade liberalisation agreement.Using the game theoretic approach, this paper analyses problems of collective action and how they may prevent a group of regional governments from realising mutually beneficial gains from regional free trade