Regret testing : learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent
Year of publication: |
September 2006
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Authors: | Foster, Dean P. ; Young, H. Peyton |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 1.2006, 3, p. 341-367
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Subject: | Learning | Nash equilibrium | regret | bounded rationality | Theorie | Theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Lernprozess | Learning process | Begrenzte Rationalität | Bounded rationality |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/150083 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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