Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Tajika, Tomoya |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 20.2020, 1, p. 1-17
|
Subject: | inefficiency | quadratic objective function | regular equilibrium | Strategic delegation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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