Regulated versus negotiated access pricing in vertically separated railway systems
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Besanko, David ; Cui, Shana |
Published in: |
Journal of regulatory economics. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0922-680X, ZDB-ID 1027173-9. - Vol. 55.2019, 1, p. 1-32
|
Subject: | Access pricing | Railway restructuring | Vertical separation | Two-part tariffs | Nash bargaining | Netzregulierung | Access regulation | Vertikale Integration | Vertical integration | Regulierung | Regulation | Schienenverkehr | Railway transport | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Schienenstrecke | Rail track | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy |
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