Regulating quality by regulating quantity:a case against minimum quality standards

We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator prefers limiting the output, orcapacity, of the incumbent firm rather than imposing a “Minimum Quality Standard” in order tohelp the entrant to provide high quality. As a by-product, our analysis makes a contribution to thestudy of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in a market with differentiated products.....

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Year of publication:	2009-09-01
Authors:	Boccard, Nicolas ; Wauthy, Xavier
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics <Louvain-la-Neuve>
Subject:	Versunkene Kosten \| sunk costs \| Qualitätsmanagement \| Markteintritt \| Preiswettbewerb \| search costs

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Extent:	615424 bytes 28 p. application/pdf
Series:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics > Publications CORE DISCUSSION PAPER ; No. 52 (2009)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L51 - Economics of Regulation ; Qualitity management ; Operations research. Other aspects ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868503