Regulation in a political economy : explaining limited commitment and the ratchet effect
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Strausz, Roland |
Published in: |
Economics of governance. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1435-6104, ZDB-ID 1491330-6. - Vol. 1.2000, 3, p. 181-197
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Subject: | Regulierung | Regulation | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Theorie | Theory |
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