Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Lefebvre, Mathieu ; Vieider, Ferdinand M. |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0040-5833, ZDB-ID 1892472. - Vol. 75.2013, 4, p. 497-517
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