Relational Contracts and Job Design

This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-veritable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.

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Year of publication:	2005-09
Authors:	Schöttner, Anja
Institutions:	Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Subject:	job design \| multi-tasking \| relational contracts

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	SFB 649 Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number SFB649DP2005-052 35 pages
Classification:	M51 - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions (hiring, firing, turnover, part-time, temporary workers, seniority issues) ; M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, job satisfaction)
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005678043