Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm
Relational contracts-informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships-are prevalent within and between firms. We develop repeatedgame models showing why and how relational contracts within firms (vertical integration) differ from those between (nonintegration). We show that integration affects the parties' temptations to renege on a given relational contract, and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain. In this sense, the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties' relationship. Our approach also has implications for joint ventures, alliances, and networks, and for the role of management within and between firms. © 2001 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Baker, George ; Gibbons, Robert ; Murphy, Kevin J. |
Published in: |
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. - MIT Press. - Vol. 117.2002, 1, p. 39-84
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Publisher: |
MIT Press |
Saved in:
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