Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness

Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Desrieux, Claudine ; Beuve, Jean
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 31.2011, 3, p. 2030-2040
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Contractual incompleteness \| Relational Contract \| Reputation \| Repeated Games

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior ; D2 - Production and Organizations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009150707