Relational political contribution under common agency
Year of publication: |
April 2017
|
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Authors: | Ishihara, Akifumi |
Published in: |
Journal of public economic theory. - Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1097-3923, ZDB-ID 1468434-2. - Vol. 19.2017, 2, p. 527-547
|
Subject: | Politikfinanzierung | Political finance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Strafe | Punishment | Implizite Kontrakte | Implicit contracts | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Theorie | Theory |
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