Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium
We analyse the equilibrium consequences of performance-based contracts for fund managers. Managerial remuneration is tied to a fund's absolute and relative performance. Investors choose whether or not to delegate their investment to better-informed fund managers; if they delegate they choose the optimal contract subject to the fund manager's participation constraint. We find that the impact of relative performance evaluation on the equilibrium equity premium and on portfolio herding critically depends on whether the participation constraint is binding. Simple numerical examples suggest that the increased importance of delegation and relative performance evaluation may lower the equity premium. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kapur, Sandeep ; Timmermann, Allan |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 115.2005, 506, p. 1077-1102
|
Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium
Kapur, Sandeep, (2004)
-
Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium
Kapur, Sandeep, (2004)
-
Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium
Kapur, Sandeep, (2005)
- More ...