Renegotiation and Relative Performance Evaluation: Why an Informative Signal may be Useless
Year of publication: |
2000-10-28
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Authors: | Yim, Andrew |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | informativeness | monitoring | renegotiation | principal-agent model |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Published in Review of Accounting Studies 1.6(2001): pp. 77-108 |
Classification: | M41 - Accounting ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; M21 - Business Economics ; C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Source: |
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Casta, Jean-François, (2005)
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Casta, Jean-François,
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