Renegotiation in Repeated Cournot-Duopoly

We investigate a repeated Cournot duopoly with strictly convex cost functions. In an example the set of Weakly Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium payoffs shrinks towards the joint profit maximizing payoff point as marginal costs are made to rise more rapidly.

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Year of publication:	1991-09
Authors:	Driffill, John ; Schultz, Christian
Institutions:	Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet
Subject:	Cournot duopoly \| renegotiation

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in: Economics Letters, 1995, 47(2) pp 143-148 Number 91-13 20 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749544