Renegotiation-proof lotteries equilibrium in an economy with private information
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Osano, Hiroshi |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 65.1995, 2, p. 435-467
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Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Vertrag | Contract | Allgemeines Gleichgewicht | General equilibrium | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
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