Rent seeking and organizational structure

Karl Wärneryd

A hierarchically structured rent-seeking contest may be associated with lower equilibrium expenditure than a corresponding flat contest. In this chapter we discuss how this fact may be used to explain the structure of organizations such as firms, including why firms commonly have outside owners.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Wärneryd, Karl
Publisher:	Stockholm : Ekonomiska Forskningsinst.
Subject:	rent seeking \| contests \| hierarchy \| ownership of firms \| Rent-Seeking \| Rent seeking \| Organisationsstruktur \| Organizational structure \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Hierarchie \| Hierarchy \| Eigentümerstruktur \| Ownership structure \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (16 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	SSE EFI working paper series in economics and finance. - Stockholm : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1402-9928, ZDB-ID 2544040-8. - Vol. 749
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/122143 [Handle]
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359931