Rent-Seeking in Research Markets.
Using a standard model of uncertain innovation, this paper examines research rivalry and rent-seeking rivalry in innovation markets. Previous literature has not considered the implications of rent-seeking in research markets. We find that greater rent-seeking by the rival unambiguously lowers own profit-maximizing research and rent-seeking activity. On the other hand, greater research spending by the rival also lowers own research and rent-seeking, especially when the probability of own innovation is low. Policy implications are discussed. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Goel, Rajeev K |
Published in: |
The Journal of Technology Transfer. - Springer. - Vol. 28.2003, 2, p. 103-09
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Bureaucratic Monopoly and the Nature and Timing of Bribes: Evidence from Croatian Data
Goel, Rajeev K, (2013)
-
R&D and Output in a Regulated Vertically Integrated Oligopoly.
Goel, Rajeev K, (1999)
-
The Substitutability of Capital, Labor, and R&D in U.S. Manufacturing.
Goel, Rajeev K, (1990)
- More ...