Rent-sharing and Collective Bargaining Coverage: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data
Using a linked employer-employee dataset, this paper analyses the relationship between firm profitability and wages. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector- and firm-specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. Our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm-specific quasi-rents in the non-union sector and under firm-specific contracts. Industry-wide wage contracts, however, are associated with a significantly lower responsiveness of wages to firm-level profitability. Copyright © The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2009. .
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Guertzgen, Nicole |
Published in: |
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 1467-9442. - Vol. 111.2009, 2, p. 323-349
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
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